Strategic Decision Report · May 2026

Should We Open More Acton-Style
Deliveroo Editions Kitchens?

A 22-month read-out of the Acton operation, with monthly, quarterly and yearly granularity, plus the scaling question fully modelled.

The Decision

One kitchen has been running for 22 months. The numbers finally make sense.

The Acton Editions kitchen is our pilot for the Deliveroo Editions model. The question on the table: does the unit economics work, and if so, do we open more?

The Question
If we opened 5 or 10 more kitchens like Acton, would the group be better off?
The honest answer depends on which year of Acton you look at. 2024 was profitable. 2025 was a labour-cost mistake. 2026 YTD is profitable again at the post-restructure cost stack. The unit works at the right labour discipline — but the path to scale runs through a Deliveroo rent concession, not through a heroic revenue assumption.
2024 Margin
+2.0%
Profitable on actual P&L
2025 Margin
-6.5%
Labour cost spiked to 26.7%
2026 YTD Margin
+2.9%
Restructure working
22-Mo Operating P/L
(£17,918)
Post-VAT, after Deliveroo rent

The Picture

22 months, three distinct chapters.

Each year tells a different story. Read them together and the pattern is clear.

The Acton Editions kitchen opened mid-2024 trading through two operating companies — Artisan Street Food Kitchens Acton Limited (ASFL) carrying the Patri family of brands, and Rice Bowl Company Acton Limited (RBC) carrying Rice Bowl, Ruby Murray, Samosawalla. Both billed Deliveroo weekly, simultaneously. By Q4 2025 ASFL had wound down; RBC has been the primary entity ever since.

Three things are immediately obvious from the monthly trend. One: turnover was meaningfully higher in 2024–2025 than in 2026, peaking in the summer of 2024. Two: profitability is not just a function of revenue — the months in 2025 with the highest gross sales also produced the deepest losses, because labour costs were running at 26-33% of Estimated Gross. Three: the late-2025 restructure brought labour back to 19-25%, and 2026 YTD is profitable on a much smaller revenue base.

The Yearly Lens

Three years, three different cost stacks.

The unit economics changed twice — once when labour spiked, once when it was cut back.

YearPeriodEst GrossTOV FoodFood % SalarySalary % VAT 12.5%Op P/LMargin
2024 6 mo / 26 wks £219,003 £175,203 £35,041 16.0% £39,000 17.8% £11,204 £4,387 2.0%
2025 12 mo / 52 wks £384,494 £307,595 £61,519 16.0% £102,727 26.7% £19,912 (£24,860) -6.5%
2026 4 mo / 18 wks £86,631 £69,305 £13,861 16.0% £17,262 19.9% £4,811 £2,555 2.9%
12024 was a profitable year. Half-year results (Jul-Dec): £215k Est Gross, £39k labour at 18.1%, post-VAT profit of £4,387. The cost stack worked.
22025 broke because of labour, not the business model. Revenue actually rose to £384k Est Gross — but salary spiked from 18% to 27% of Est Gross. £64k of extra labour cost compared to a flat-staffed 2024.
32026 YTD is profitable again at 19.9% labour cost. Smaller revenue (£87k Est Gross over 4 months) but +£2,555 profit — the unit can post a profit on lower volume if the cost stack is right.

The Quarterly Lens

Smoother trend lines, same conclusion.

Eight quarters of operating data. The profitable quarters cluster at the start and end. The middle was the labour cost mistake.

QuarterWeeksEst Gross FoodFood % SalarySalary % VATOp P/LMargin
Q3 2024 13 £113,231 £18,117 16.0% £19,500 17.2% £5,991 £4,319 3.8%
Q4 2024 13 £105,772 £16,923 16.0% £19,500 18.4% £5,213 £69 0.1%
Q1 2025 13 £90,504 £14,481 16.0% £26,282 29.0% £4,412 (£9,880) -10.9%
Q2 2025 13 £101,538 £16,246 16.0% £26,000 25.6% £5,292 (£5,204) -5.1%
Q3 2025 13 £102,318 £16,371 16.0% £26,363 25.8% £5,147 (£6,705) -6.6%
Q4 2025 13 £90,133 £14,421 16.0% £24,082 26.7% £5,062 (£3,071) -3.4%
Q1 2026 13 £66,134 £10,581 16.0% £13,400 20.3% £3,946 £3,640 5.5%
Q2 2026 5 £20,497 £3,280 16.0% £3,862 18.8% £865 (£1,085) -5.3%

Unit Economics — Annualised Mature Run-Rate

On every £100 of sticker price (Estimated Gross), here's where it goes.

Based on 2026 YTD post-restructure run-rate, annualised. The cleanest view of the unit.

Sticker / Estimated Gross (customer-facing price)
£100
– Marketer Discount (Deliveroo voucher/promo at checkout)
£(20)
Total Order Value (what customer pays)
£80
– Deliveroo charges (commission + ads + licence + ops fee + recharges)
£(36)
Net Payable (cash to bank)
£44
– Food cost (actuals from purchasing records)
£(16)
– Salary (actuals from rota software, mature run-rate)
£(20)
– VAT @ 12.5% of Net Payable (HMRC flat-rate scheme)
£(6)
Operating Profit / (Loss) — per £100 of sticker
£+2.9

The takeaway: on every £100 of sticker price, the customer pays £80 after marketer discount, Deliveroo keeps roughly £36 of that £80, and we receive about £44 to the bank. From that £44, food eats £16, labour eats £18, VAT eats £5 — leaving about £4-5 of operating profit per £100. It's a thin-margin business by design, but at the right labour cost, it works.

The Scaling Question

If 1 kitchen works at +3-5% margin, what about 5? Or 10?

Eight scenarios, modelled. The honest answer depends on two variables: the Deliveroo rent negotiation, and our ability to hold the labour discipline.

# KitchensRent WaivedRevenue Growth Annual Revenue / KitchenAnnual P/L / Kitchen Total RevenueTotal Annual P/LMargin
1 Flat £250,267 £7,381 £250,267 £7,381 2.9%
1 ✓ Yes Flat £250,267 £29,437 £250,267 £29,437 11.8%
5 Flat £250,267 £7,381 £1,251,334 £36,903 2.9%
5 ✓ Yes Flat £250,267 £29,437 £1,251,334 £147,183 11.8%
5 ✓ Yes +20% £300,320 £30,913 £1,501,601 £154,564 10.3%
10 Flat £250,267 £7,381 £2,502,669 £73,807 2.9%
10 ✓ Yes Flat £250,267 £29,437 £2,502,669 £294,367 11.8%
10 ✓ Yes +20% £300,320 £30,913 £3,003,202 £309,128 10.3%
Without a Deliveroo rent concession, opening more Editions kitchens just multiplies a small loss. With the concession, each additional kitchen contributes ~£15-25k of annual profit — and that's the scale case.

The five things scaling depends on

1Deliveroo Rent Waiver. The licence fee + ops fee combination costs us ~£22k/year per site. Across 5 sites that's £110k/year of pure profit drag. Negotiating a waiver (or even a reduction to £6-8k) is the single biggest lever on the scale case.
2Labour Discipline Is Non-Negotiable. 2025 showed that even one quarter of overstaffing destroys the unit economics. With 5 kitchens, central rota oversight needs to be tighter than the current pilot model — one operations lead, weekly cost-stack reviews, hard cap at 22% labour-to-gross.
3Brand Focus, Not Brand Fragmentation. Acton runs 8 virtual brands but only 2 do meaningful volume. Future kitchens should launch with 2 brands maximum — Patri Artisan plus one local-fit brand. Brand fragmentation is a tax, not a moat.
4Capex Recovery. Each new Editions kitchen costs roughly £50-75k to set up (equipment, deposits, menu development, photography, opening marketing). At +£15-20k/year profit per site with rent waived, payback is 3-4 years. Acceptable for a portfolio, painful if any single site fails.
5The Dishoom Gap is the Upside. Dishoom Editions Acton does an estimated £40k/week vs our £4-5k/week. If even one of our kitchens reaches Dishoom-scale volume, the contribution would dwarf 4 normal sites. The bet is whether our brand can grow into that ceiling.

The Comparator

What Dishoom Acton shows us is possible.

Same site, same demographic, same Editions platform — Dishoom does 8× our current weekly volume — but only 4× our previous peak. The gap is closer than it looks.

Acton Weekly
£4,813
Current run-rate (2026 YTD avg)
Acton AT PEAK
£10k
Previously achieved · 25% of Dishoom
Dishoom Weekly (est)
£40k
Industry estimate
Gap to Close
8.3×
Volume multiple required
If We Hit 50% of Dishoom
£20k/wk
Roughly £80k/yr profit per site

The gap to Dishoom isn't a marketing problem. It's a structural one: focused brand, iconic SKUs, premium pricing, clean bundle ladder. Dishoom runs ONE brand with 4 hero items driving 50% of revenue and bundles anchored at three clean price points (£24.95 / £45 / £85). We run 8 brands with hundreds of items and 7 overlapping bundle prices.

Closing even half this gap on one new kitchen would change the entire portfolio economics. The case for opening more kitchens lives or dies on the willingness to consolidate behind Patri Artisan as the lead brand and treat new kitchens as Patri-only launches, not eight-brand rollouts.

The Recommendation

Three-stage decision, not a single yes/no.

Recommended Path
Stabilise Acton. Negotiate rent. Then open Kitchen #2 as a controlled test.

Stage 1 — Now to Q3 2026 (Stabilise): Hold the 2026 cost stack discipline. Keep labour at 20-23% of Est Gross. Maintain 4-5% post-VAT margin. Use the 2026 YTD profitable trajectory as proof in the Deliveroo negotiation.

Stage 2 — Q3-Q4 2026 (Negotiate): Take the Deliveroo Account Manager through Reports 1 & 2 in the master workbook. Ask for: 12-month licence fee waiver, commission reduction from 28.8% to 20%, £5k ad credit, £7 OFF £7+ always-on inclusion. Commitment in return: 15% YoY GMV growth, AOV £35+, Plus member share 55%+, 2-brand focus.

Stage 3 — 2027 (Test Scale): If Deliveroo concedes on rent, open Kitchen #2 in a comparable demographic (suggest Camden or Hammersmith). Launch with 2 brands only (Patri Artisan + Rice Bowl). Hold cost discipline from day one. Review at month 9 — go or no-go on Kitchens 3-5.

The trigger to NOT scale: If Deliveroo refuses any rent concession AND we cannot show 4 consecutive quarters of positive operating margin, exit the model. Don't multiply a loss-making structure.

What this report changes vs. the model-based view

The theoretical model (Food 25% / Staff 30% of Gross) implied this operation was structurally broken — a £59k loss across 22 months. The actuals tell us the operation lost £18k post-VAT, driven mostly by a single bad year. The unit isn't broken. It needs labour discipline and a Deliveroo rent concession, both of which are within reach.

For a multi-site decision, this matters enormously. Scaling a broken unit destroys capital. Scaling a thin-margin-but-working unit, with one well-defined unlock (the rent waiver), is a calculated bet. The recommendation reflects that distinction.